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Loret HALSBURY, L. C.: My Lords, in this case I have had
much greater difficulty in dealing with the question of form
than with the substantial question between the parties which it
was intended to raise by this appeal. It is, I think, manifest
that the interlocutor does not comply with the provisions of the
Judicature Act of 1825, and I cannot but regret that the suggestion of Lord RUTHERFORD> CLARK was not adopted, by which
that wlich was fact would have been found as fact, and the
question of law, which alone under that statute is open to your
Lordships to review, would have been left to be determined.
Nevertheless, although with some doubt, I have come to the
conclusion that your Lordships may treat the questions of fact as
having been determined, and the questions of law as sufficiently
severed from those questions of fact to enable your Lordships to
pronounce a final judgment between the parties.
My Lords, the question which it was intended to raise was the
legal right of the respondent to publish, in the form of a pamphlet, certain literary compositions of the appellant, which were
orally delivered to the students of the University of Glasgow
attending his class. A majority of the court has determined
that the pamphlet in question is a reproduction of the appellant's
literary composition; and I do not stop to discuss what some of
their Lordships appeared to have considered important, that in
respect of certain particulars it was a blundering and unsuccessful reproduction of the appellant's work. I confess I am unable to understand what place such topics find in the argument.
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Assume an unlawful reproduction of an author's literary work,
it does not become less an injury to the legal right because the
reproducer has disfigured his reproduction with ignorant or foolish additions of his own. It is not denied, and it cannot in the
present state of the law be denied, that an author has a proprietary right in his own unpublished literary productions. It is
further incapable of denial that that proprietary right may still
continue, notwithstanding some kind of communication to others.
The case of private letters, which though conveniently described
by the word "private," involve publication of a certain kind to
others than the author of them, is an illustration of a communication which does not permit the infringement of the proprietary. right which could be involved in their unauthorized general
publication. The doubt which I have entertained in the course
of the argument has been whether the extent and degree of publication in the case now under debate was not a question of fact
which should have been determined on the evidence before the
court, and which if it had been determined, would not have
been opened to your Lordships to review. But as I have said, I
have come to the conclusion that in the form in which it has
arisen it may be treated as a question of law, that is to say,
whether on the agreed state of facts such a publication as is
proved here must as a matter of law deprive the author of the
literary composition in question of his proprietary right, and
whether the fiact that he is professor of moral philosophy, teaching in his class-room by the literary composition which is now
the subject of debate, makes his delivery of that literary composition necessarily public to the whole world, so as to entitle any
one who heard it to republish it without the permission of its
author.
Now, my Lords, I have designedly used the phrase "literary
composition" to avoid the ambiguity of the word "lecture,"
because I think the word "lecture" involves an assumption
which may give rise to error. If by it is signified a lecture delivered on behalf of the university, and so to speak as the
lecture of the university itself, as the authorized exposition of
the university teaching, I can well understand that by the nature
of the thing, from the circumstances of its delivery, and the object with which it was delivered, it would be impossible to say
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that it was intended by those on whose behalf the professor was
lecturing, or by himself, to limit the right of communication to
others. Whether that limitation of the right arises from implied
contiact or from the existing relation between the hearers and
the author, it is intelligible that where a person speaks a speech
to which all the world is invited, either expressly or impliedly,
to listen, or preaches a sermon in a church, the doors of which
are thrown open to all mankind, the mode and manner of publication negative, as it appears to me, any limitation. But without using any phrase which by force of its ordinary meaning
implies either a kind of publication, or involves a limitation of the right of publication, what are the facts here as
found by the majority of the court? A teacher is in his classroom with his students. For the purpose of teaching them he
uses a composition of his own, in this case called "The Law of
Moral Philosophy." Suppose it had been exercises in grammar,
arithmetic, or foreign language. The object and purpose is to
teach the students, to enable them to become proficients in the
various subjects of which the teacher is the professor. The student is entitled to avail himself of the teaching. The object is
to make him a good grammarian, a good arithmetician, or a proficient in the particular language that is taught. But could it
be contended that by reasons of such communication to such
students each of them was entitled to publish the professor's exercises, dialogues, dictionary, or the like?
My Lords, it seems to me that it might be, and indeed there is
some suggestion here that it is, contrary both to the spirit and
meaning of what is called a lecture that students should be supplied with some mode of answering questions on the subject of
their lectures without that process of mental digestion which is
intended to form the substance of the teaching. Illustrations
might be infinitely multiplied in which the whole purpose of a
professor's teaching might be rendered nugatory by the unauthorized reproduction of his mode of teaching.
The ground on which I have been able to come to the conclusion that the particular form of literary composition, and the
degree of communication which is established to a limited class,
may be treated as a question of law is, that it appears to have
been decided, that notwithstanding the professor's desire to pre-
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vent such reproduction, and contrary to his intention, the delivery of his lecture--of his composition-to a limited class of
students, operates as matter of law to make his composition public, and to prevent his enforcing any proprietary right.
My Lords, I am not aware of any university regulation, or
any bargain with its professors, which either expressly or impliedly enforces on the professors the making public of their literary compositions, of whatever class these compositions may be,
and whether merely educational and intended for the use of their
students or intended for mere general diffusion. I am disposed
to think, although it does not become necessary to discuss it in
the present case, that if a professor had entered into a specific
bargain to make public the lectures which he was delivering to
his students, but, contrary to that bargain, had enforced on his
students the condition of secrecy, though the university which
employed him on that express bargain might be at liberty to
seek their remedy against him for a breach of his undertaking,
it would not necessarily make public that which the lecturer
himself had neither expressly nor impliedly communicated for
general reproduction.
My Lords, I doubt whether any of the cases which have been
brought to your Lordships' attention do more than establish the
two propositions which, as I have said, cannot now be in debate.
The application of the principles laid down in these cases is what
gives rise to the matter now in discussion. I do not thinkit very
important to consider what was the ultimate result of Mr. Abernethy's appeal to Lord ELDON, because the ground of Lord
ELDmO's decision, as originally given, seems not to have been
affected if an arrangement between the parties, as seems probable,
put an end to the litigation.
With respect to the act, 5 & 6 Will. IV, ch. 65, I am not
prepared to say that I can obtain any light from its provisions.
I had at one time an impression that there was something in the
nature of a declaration by the legislature that lectures delivered
in a university or a public school or any public foundation were
to be assumed to be so published as for the future to becomepublic property; and if that were assumed to be the construction of
the statute, a serious question would arise as to what were lectures
within the meaning of that statute. But I am now satisfied that
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the language of the statute has been adopted by the legislature
for the purpose of not interfering in any way with the law existing on the subject. Possibly it may be that the difficulty of defining what should be a lecture may have occurred to the author
of the statute, or the impolicy of affecting to lay down a rule
where many circumstances of convenience as to modes of instruction, and so forth, might be appropriately left to the university
authorities, may have produced the legislation which in fact
exists. At all events, I can derive no assistance from a statute
which professes to leave the law as it is without professing to
give any hint of what it assumes the law to be.
I am therefore of opinion that the appellant ought to succeed,
and I concur in the suggested form ofjudgment which has been
prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord WAosoN and I
move your Lordships accordingly.
LORD WATSON. [Omitting detailed statement.] The author
of a lecture on moral philosophy, or of any other original composition, retains a right of property in his work which entitles
him to prevent its publication by others until it has with his consent been communicated to the public. Since the case of Teffreys
v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815, was decided by this House in the
year 1854, it must be taken as settled by law, that upon such
communication being made to the public, whether orally or by
the circulation of written or printed copies of the work, the author's right of property ceases to exist. Copyright, which is the
exclusive privilege of multiplying copies after publication, is the
creature of statute, and with that right we have nothing to do in
the present case. The only question which we have to decide is
whether the oral delivery of the appellant's lectures to the
students attending his class is in law equivalent to communication to the public.
The author's right of property in his unpublished work being
undoubted, it has also been settled that he may communicate it
to others under such limitations as will not interfere with the
continuance of the right. "He has," as was said by Lord
BROUGHAm in .Teffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 962, "the undisputed right to his manuscript; he may withhold or he may communicate it, and communicating it, he may limit the number of
persons to whom it is imparted, and impose such restrictions as
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he pleases upon their use of it. The fulfillment of the annexed
%conditionshe may proceed to enforce, and for their breach he
may claim compensation." He cannot print and sell without
publishing his work, but he may legitimately impose restrictions
which will prevent its publication, whether the communication
be made by giving copies for private perusal or by recitation before a select audience. In the latter case the retention of the
author's right depends upon its being either matter of contract
or an implied condition, that the audience are admitted for the
purpose of receiving instruction or amusement, and not in order
that they may take a full note of what they hear, and publish it
for their own profit and for the information of the public at large.
Upon that principle it was decided in .lfacklin v. Richardson,
2 Amb. 694, that the fact of a play having been acted for several
years in a public theatre with permission of the author did not
imply an abandonment of his right, and that he was therefore
entitled to restrain its publication from notes taken by a shorthand writer who had paid for admission to the theatre. On the
other hand, I do not doubt that a lecturer who addresses himself to the public generally without distinction of persons, or
selection or restriction of his hearers, has, as the Lord President
observes in this case, "abandoned his ideas and words to the use
of the public at large, or, in other words, has himself published
them."
The main argument addressed to your Lordships for the respondent was to the effect that a professorship in a Scotch university, being munis publicum, and the occupant of the office
being under an obligation to receive into his class all comers
having the requisite qualification, his lectures are really addressed
to the public, and at all events that there is no room for inferring
that the students are taught under an implied condition that they
shall not print and publish his lectures, either for their own
profit or otherwise. I do not think it can be disputed that, as
,stated by Lord SAND, this is the first occasion in the history of
the Scottish universities on which any such right as that now
claimed has been asserted. If the claim be well founded, there
can be no copyright in a lecture which has been once delivered
in the class-room. Yet it is the fact that professors and their
representatives have been in frequent use to publish lectures
which had been annually delivered for years before such publi-
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cation, and have enjoyed, without objection or challenge, the
privilege of copyright. That has been notably the case with
our great academic teachers of moral and mental philosophy,
from Dr. Thomas Reid, who was appointed to the chair now
held by the appellant in 1763, to the late Sir William Hamilton.
I concede, that although such may have been the prevalent understanding in Scotland as to the professor's right, this is not
a case in which it can be said that communis errorfacitjus;but
I agree with Lord SaNn's observation, that in these circumstances effect ought not to be given to the respondent's argument
unless he can make it clear "in principle or authority that the
law gives him the right he claims."
In the court below there was a good deal of discussion as to
the practical result of deciding this case one way or another. I
am afraid that I do not estimate so highly as some of the learned
judges the advantage of having the professor's lectures printed
and subjected to the criticism of public opinion. The capable
critics are a small, and by no means unanimous, section of the
community; and I doubt whether the governing body of the
university or the professor would derive any assistance from
their strictures, whilst experience has shown that the public
who are interested in it are not ignorant of the character of university teaching. An original thinker and able teacher very
soon attracts a large class, and vice versa. I certainly do not
appreciate the advantage to the public of furnishing (which is
the professed object of the respondent) the appellant's students
with a "crib," an aid to knowledge forbidden in well-regulated
educational institutions, which, as the Lord Chancellor has
already pointed out, supersedes the necessity of intellectual
effort and neutralizes the benefit of the professor's tuition.
There appeared to me to be some force in the suggestion of the
appellant's counsel, that if it be now held for the first time that
delivery of his lectures is publication, the professor may in
future (contrary to his present practice) hesitate to communicate
his best and most original thoughts to his class before they have
been matured and given to the world by himself. But I do not
think these observations, however important they may be in
themselves, are decisive of the present question.
[His Lordship then reviewed at length Abernethy v. Hutehinson,1 H. & T. 28, and continued :]

CAIRD v. SIME.

I do not think that students of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow, or in any other Scotch university, either are,
or can with propriety be said to represent the general public; of
course, they are, each and all of them, members of the public,
but they do not attend the professor's lectures in that capacity.
They must be members of the university, and they must further
comply with its regulations and make payment to the professor
of the usual fee, in return for which they receive from him a
ticket or certificate of their enrollment as students for the session; and without observing these preliminaries, they would
have no right to enter his class-room during the lecture hour.
The relation of the professor to his students is simply that of
teacher and pupil; his duty is, not to address the public at large,
but to instruct his students; and their right is to profit by his
instruction, but not to report or publish his lectures. It appears to me that the learned judges whose opinions are adverse
to the appellant have attributed undue weight to the circumstance that the appellant's office is munis 'ublicum. That it is
so is an undoubted fact, but according to my apprehension, the
question which your Lordships have to decide depends, not upon
that fact, but upon the duty which the appellant's office requires
him to fulfill. The nature of the duty incumbent upon a professor in an English university is thus described by Lord ELDoN,
in Abernethy v. .Futchinson,3 L. J. (Ch.) 209 ; 1 H1. and T. 28:
"Now if a professor be appointed, he is appointed for the purpose of giving information to all his students who attend him,
and it is his duty to do that; but I have never yet heard that
anybody could publish his lectures." So far as I know, there
is no difference whatever between the position of a Scotch and
that of an English university professor, so far as regards their
relations to the students whom they teach; and no point of difference •has been suggested, either in the court below or by the
respondent's counsel. The fact of his being a public official lays
the appellant under an obligation to the state as well as those
who pay for their instruction, to teach efficiently, and to the best
of his abilities; it does not affect the nature of his obligation, and
cannot alter the relation between him and his students.
Lord FITzGERALD dissented.
VoL. XXXV.-96
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The above case involves a very interesting question in the law of
literary property. With regard to
the protection afforded by a statutory
copyright, the law may be said to have
been promptly settled, but for a long
time there was a difference of opinion
as to how far it would or could protect the property of an author in an
uncopyrighted writing or literary
work, and as to the effect of statutes
of copyright upon the legal status
of literary property. From early
times in the history of the legislation
in which the difference was manifested,
it was maintained on the one side
that, whatever may have been the
Tight of an author to keep his liter-ary work to himself, so long as he
.allowed no one to have a copy there,of, yet when once he had allowed a
copy to become public, even in a limited sense, whatever right he had to
.prevent the multiplication, printing,
-or distribution of further copies was
derived solely from statute, in other
words, as is sometimes said, that there
was no common law copyright after
publication. On the other hand, it
was maintained that such a right did
exist at common law and that statutes
of copyright merely provided or added
a penalty or remedy for the violation
of a known right.
The right of an author to keep
secret his writing and to prevent its
unauthorized publication before publication by himself is acknowledged
universally and does not seem to have
ever been seriously questioned: Bartlelte v. Crietenden,5 McLean 32; Wheaton v.Peters,8 Pet.591; Jenesv. Thorne,
1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 408; W'oolsey v.
Judd, 4 D er. 379; Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32; but the question
whether after publication any right
of prevention existed at common law
first came up in the carefully considered cases of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr-

2303 (769) and Donaldsonv. Benedic;
Id. 2409, which was dependent on
.Millar v. Taylor. Millar v. Taylor
arose upon an unauthorized publication of Thompson's "Seasons" after
the work, which was not copyrighted,
had been published by a person authorized by the poet. In the King's
Bench Lord MsNrmL and WIL.
LES and AsToN, JJ.,were of opinion
that at the common law a copyright
existed, the ground of decision being
that publication by an author gave
nothing but the right of perusal, the
publication and sale of copies of the
book being likened to the giving to
the buyers of so many keys to a gate
or so many tickets to an opera, which
were only given to the recipients
themselves and would not entitle
them to forge other keys or tickets.
The learnedjudges also held that this
right was not abrogated by the statute
of 8 Anne (the British Copyright Act).
YAT s,J., dissented, and after stating
the position of the majority of the
court said: "To this the answer is, I
think, easy and evident. If the author had not published his work at
all, but only lent it to a particular
person, he might have enjoined that
particular person that he should only
peruse it * * * because in that
case the author's copy is his own, and
the party to whom it is lent contracts
to observe the conditions of the loan,
but when the author makes a general
publication of his work he throws it
open tq all mankind.
"That is, then, very different from
the case of giving keys or tickets to
particular persons. The very condition of giving them is the exclusion
of all other persons, and these keys or
tickets give the party to whom they
are given no property to the land
they pass through or to the opera
house. They are given them for a
particular time, and to 'give them a
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transient admission, a temporary
privilege only. It is like an author
lending his manuscript to particular
friends who stillretains the right over
it to recall it whenever he pleases.
But when an author prints and publishes his work he lays it entirely
open to the public as much as when an
owner of a piece of land lays it open
into the highway. Neither the book
nor the sentiment it contains can
afterwards be recalled by the author.
Every purchaser of a book is the
owner of it, and as such he hasa right
to make what use of it he pleases.'
In 1873 the same question involved in
.Iillar v. Taylor and Hinton v. Donaldson, Hailes 535, came before the
Lordsof Council and Session, bywbom
the decision of the King's Bench was
treated but with scant respect. Lord
AucnnLicHEi saying, "The question
is interesting, and never received
judgment but once in England, and
there, too, the judges differed nil tam
absurdum quod non dicendo fit probabilis," and Lord HALES, the reporter,
adds with great frankness, "Lord
AucEn dxHF told me that he had
read the report of Burrow, that he
understood Judge YATES' opinion
but not the others. Now," said he,
"when I meet a thing that I do not
understand, I conclude it to be nonsense.' Lord MoNBoDDo, it is true,
agreed with the King's Bench, butthe
court ruled contrary to the cited decision. Lord AucLncHEE said, "If
once a man speaks out a sentiment he
communicates it to his hearers and it
is theirs forever." The Lord Justice
Cirx
said, "After a man has once
given his copy to the public there is
no principle in the common law
which can limit the use of that copy,"
and the Lord President said, "The
Act 8th Anne is absurd if a prior
common-law right had been established.' So the court held that there

was no common-law copyright. In
the next year the House of Lords
considered the matter, the case coming to it on an appeal from the Court
of Chancery (the great seal having
been at the time of the decision in that
court in commission, the commissioners being SxYTuE, B., and ASToN
and BAT uRST, JJ.), which, on the
authority of .Millarv. Taylor, granted an injunction in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett. The case is reported in 4 Bur. 2409. The Lords
sent for the judges and submitted to
them inter alia the following, (a)
whether the author of any literary
composition and his assigns had the
sole right of printing and publishing
the same in perpetuity by the common law?
This question was answered in the
affirmative by SmYTrHn, L. C. B., and
INARES,
ASHImRsT, BLACxSTONE,
WELLES, ASTON, and GouLD, JJ.,
and in the negative by DE GnEy, L.
C. J., and EYRE, ADAx, and P REorr, B.

B.

(b) Whether this right was impeached or restrained or taken away
by the statute of 8 Anne? Upon this
the judges decided as follows: in the
affirmative, DE GREY, L. C. J., NARES,
and GoULD, JJ., EYnx, PnnRoTT, and
ADAM, B. B.; in the negative, by
SMYTiE,
L. C. B. ; AsHuRsT,
BiACKSTONE, VELES, and. ASTo,
JJ.
(c) Whether the remedy was confined to that given by the statute.
This was answered-aye, DE Gpay,
L. C. J.; NA sSand GouLD, JJ.;
Eypx, Pt_
To, and ADAxa, B. B.;
no, S=ITHE, L. C. B., AsnuxRsT,

BLAcxSTONF, Wm.r.s, and ASToN.
The result of the opinions was, therefore, that a copyright existed at common law, that this right was abridged
by the statute of Anne, and that no
remedy for its notation or means of
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enforcing it existed other than those
given by the statute; the House, thereupon, on motion of Lord CAMDEN,
seconded by the Lord Chancellor
(BA iruasT), reversed the decision of
the commissioners. In 1798, in Beckford v. ood, 7 D. & E. 620, the common-law right was so far recognized
that an action for damages was austained for an unauthorized publication made within the time limited by
the statute of 8 Anne, although the
requirements of the act had not been
complied with. From the foregoing
review it will be seen that the professional opinion was quite evenly divided; but in the great case of Tefferys
v. Boosey, 4 H. of L. 815, the matter
was finally settled, after a full discussion, and after hearing the judges,
of whom ten delivered opin'ions, six
for and four against the common-law
right. The House decided that after
publication no common-law right existed; opinions were delivered by
Lords BROUGmrA and St. LEOFkaDs.
The former said: "The right of the
author before publication we may take
to be unquestioned, and we may even
assume that never was, when accurately defined: denied. He has the
undisputed right to his manuscripthe may withhold it-he may communicate it, and communicating, he may
limit the number of persons to whom
it is imparted, and impose such restrictions as he pleases upon their use of it.
* * * Whatever may have been the
original right of the author, the publication appears to be of necessity an
abandonment; so ]ong as lie kept the
composition to himself, or to a select
few placed under conditions, he was
like the ownerof a private road; none
but himself or those he permitted
could use it, but when he made the
work public he resembled that donor,
after he had abandoned it, who could
not directly prohibit passengers or ex-

act from them a consideration for the
use of it."
Prevlous to this decision, the Supreme Court of the United States had
decided that the common law of Pennsylvania did not recognize copyright
after publication, and that the Act of
Congress was not the sanctioning of
an existent but the creation of a new
right. In thisjudgment MARSHA.L,
C. J., STORY and McLra, JJ., concurred; from it TroMPsox and ]3ADwi-, JJ., dissented. JoHmsox, J.,
was absent, and it does not appear from
the report whether DOvALL, T., sat.
It may then be taken as settled (1),
that until publication the author of a
literary work has the right to withhold it from publication, and may
enjoin or recover damages for an unauthorized publication; (2) that
after publication his rights are only
such as are secured to him by the
copyright statute.
This brings us to the consideration
of the question more immediately involved in the principal case, viz.:
What is "publication" ? in other
words, when will an author be held
to have so far presented his work to
the world at large that his control
over it has ceased-when to have
thrown it into the common stock of
the world's possessions beyond the
power of reclamation ?
An author has an undoubted right
to lend his manuscript to another
person, and where there is no intent
that the, other shall be permitted to
print or circulate it there is no publication-this was held as long ago as
the case of the -Duke of Queensberry
v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329 (1757), and
can hardly be said to be at all questioned-and any attempt to print is
enjoinable, not only as a violation of
the author's property right, but also
as a breach of confidence and good
faith, and it is worthy of notice that
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two of the judges who in Donaldson
v. Beckett thought that no action lay
at common law to enforce an author's
copyright, excepted cases in which
a copy had been obtained by fraud
or violence. The delivery of a manuscript for a particular purpose, although that purpose contemplated
the communication of the contents to
certain other persons, will not amount
to publication. Thus in Bartlette v.
Crittenden, 4 McLean 300; 5 McLean
32 (1847, 1849), where a teacher of
bookkeeping allowed written copies
of his manuscript to be taken by his
pupils for their instruction and for
use in teaching others, it was held
that there was no publication, and an
attempt to print and sell copies was
enjoined. A work may even be delivered to be printed without such
act amounting to a setting at large
where such is not the intention. See
-Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. &
Sm. 652 (1848-9), affirmed in 1 M. N.
& G. 25 (1849). A more intricate
question arises when the act claimed
to constitute publication does not consist in printing or in delivering a
manuscript, but in the performance
or recital of a composition intended
to be recited, as a play or a lecture.
The course of decision upon this subject is very interesting, and there has
been a wavering of authority with
regard to it, though we think the law
has now become tolerably settled.
The question has arisen most frequently in litigation with reference to
the right to produce plays, and has
incidentally drawn with it the question of what is a violation of an
author's right in an uncopyrighted
literary work. The earliest case we
find is Macklin v. Richardson, 2 Amb.
694 (1771), which, in spite of a doubt
attempted to be thrown upon it in
Keene v. Clarke, 5 Robt. 38, is law at
the present day. Macklin was the

author of a farce, "Love a la Mode,"
which was acted in 1760 and the following years, but only by his permission, and from the performance of
which he derived a revenue by way
of royalty. The defendants employed
Mr. Gurney to take the piece in shorthand and published in their magazine a portion thereof, promising the
rest in a future issue. The court
granted an injunction, holding that
the performance of the piece did not
amount to a setting it at large. In
1793 a new point was taken, and in
Coleman v. Wathen, 5 D. & E. 245,
where there was no evidence of printing or copying, the court held that
the mere fact of the unauthorized
performance of a piece-in this case
a copyrighted one-was not evidence of a literary piracy, Bu'L.ER,
J., saying, "Reporting anything from
memory can never be a publication
within the statute. Some instances
of memory are very surprising; but
the mere act of repeating such a performance cannot be left as evidence
to the jury that the defendant had
pirated the work itself.'
This case, it is thought, is not now
of authority and rests entirely upon
a false basis, probably arising from
the failure of the court to recognize
a distinction between publishing in
the sense of setting at large for the
general public use of something
which the publisher has originated
or acquired by assignment from
the originator, and publication in the
sense of the giving to thepublic or to a
portion of it, for profit, that which
belongs not to the publisher but to
the author or his assignee, so as to
interfere with the profits legitimately
demanded by the author or assignee.
In this country we do not find any
traces of the consideration of the
question until about 1857, in the litigation which arose over the produc-
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tion of "Our American Cousin." It
came first before the United States
Circuit Court for Pennsylvania, E.
D., in Xeen v. Wleatley, 9 Am. L.
Reg. 33, and CADWALADER, J., thus
defined publication: "A publication
of such a composition is an act which
renders its contents in any mode or
degree an addition to the store of
human knowledge. Every communication of a knowledge of such contents or of any primary result of
mental development, unless confidential, is more or less a publication."
At the same time he recognized the
law to be that restrictions might be
thrown about a communication which
would prevent its being regarded as a
publication in the broad general
sense, and held that every violation
of a condition expressed or implied
in a limited publication as to the
diffusion of the knowledge communicated would be redressed as a breach
of good faith; but he further held that
a public 'stage performance, given
with the authors assent, to which any
one purchasing a ticket might claim
admission, was such a publication as
would permit the play, if uucopyrighted, to be afterwards enacted by
any person without responsibility
therefor to the author. The learned
judge, in the course of his opinion,
gave utterance to a dictum (possibly
suggested by Coleman v. WIathen)
which, although now overthrown, has
been extensively followed-to the
effect that a person might lawfully
repeat or re-enact so much of a play as
he had acquired by the exercise of
his memory alone, but not what he
had acquired by the use of notes taken
stenographically or otherwise. This
dictum, which rests on the theory
that a man presenting a play in public must expect that the audiencewill
remember at least a part of it, but cannot expect that any person will write

down what is said by the actors, although it proceeds from a really great
judge, of a class which is most unfor.
tunately small in number, does not
seem to be well founded, for the matter to be considered is not how the
author expects the audience to get a
knowledge of his play, but what use
he may reasonably expect to have
made of that knowledge; he may
reasonably expect that they will talk
over and criticise the play, and perhaps, even, that some gifted person
may "go through" certain parts of it
for the amusement of friends in a
parlor, but not that any one will represent it in its entirety or in any
essential part so as to deprive the
author or his assignee of the profits
they might expect from future performances. The same question, and
with reference to the same play, came
before the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in 1860 in Keene v.
.imball, 16 Gray 545, and the court
held that while a public performance
was not such a publication as would
permit the play to be afterwards presented by any one, yet there was
no right after such performance to
prevent an unauthorized representation; the court also followed Judge
CAnDwALRA's dictum, for while it
said, "If persons by frequent attendance at a theatre have committed to
memory any part or the whole of the
play, they have a right to repeat what
they have heard to others. We know
of no right of property in gestures,
tones, or scenery which would forbid
such reproduction of them by the
spectators as their powers of imitation
might enable them to accomplish;" it
also said, "we do not in this decision
intend to intimate that there is any
right to repeat phonographically or
otherwise, a lecture or other written
discourse which its author declaims
before a public audience, and which
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he desires again to use in like manner for his own profit, and to publish
it without his consent, or to make any
use of a copy thus obtained." Again,
in Keene v. Clarke, 5 Robt. 38 (1867),
Keene v. Wheatley and the dictum
therein were followed, and ROBERTso., C. J., delivering the opinion,
denied that there was any understanding which could be regarded as
a condition of admission that a play
should not be memorized and reproduced, and spoke of the propriety of
printing such a restriction upon the
tickets if it were desired to prevent
such use being made of access to the
theatre, saying, "Such precautions
are necessary to protect the exclusive
right to an uncopyrighted production,
otherwise they would stand on the
same footing as if they were copyrighted." In the same year the
United States Circuit Court for Illinois, N. D., recognized the rule that
performance was not publication, but
as it appeared that the plays before
it had been printed abroad an injunction was refused: Boudcault v. Wood,2
Bissell 34. In Crowe v. Aiken, 2 Id.
208 (1878), the same court held that
a mere performance was not publication and enjoined a production where
a copy of a play had been obtained
from notes surreptitiously taken; at
the same time, while the court hesitated, it did not dissent from the
memory dictum, the case not calling
for a decision upon its correctness,
but DRumzo, J., after stating the
law to be that performance did not
constitute a dedication to the public
at large, added "except possibly so
far as those who witness its performance can recollect it, and that the
spectators have not the right to secure
its reproduction by phonographip or
other verbatim report independent of
memory." In 1872, in Palmer v. De
Wi, 47 N.Y. 532, it was held that a

public performance would not authorize the presumption of the abandonment of property so as to allow a
printing.
So far we have a straining, as it
were, to get away from the position
originally taken that a performance
was an abandonment, unless that
effect were guarded against by notice,
and a growing doubt as to the correctness of the memory dictum. In
1878 a subordinate court in New York
held that a performance would not
justify an unauthorized subsequent
performance; French v. ilaguire, 55
How. Pr. 471, and in 1882 in Tompkins
v. Halleck, 133 MAass. 32, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts deliberately reversed its action in following Keene v. WMeadley. A copy of
"The World" had been made from
memory, and the play was represented
therefrom; the case presented, therefore, precisely the features passed
upon actually or hypothetically in
Kecne v. Wheatley. In delivering the
opinion of the court granting an injunction, D.Evxs, J., said: "The
theory that the lawful right to represent a play may be acquired through
the exercise of memory but not
through the use of stenography, writing, or notes is entirely unsatisfactory.
The public, it is true, as said in Beene
v. Ximball, 'acquire a right to the
extent of the dedication, whether
complete or partial, which ihe proprietor has made of it to the public.'
But the question is as to the extent
of that dedication * * * the mode in
which the literary property of another is taken possession of cannot be
important. * ** In whatever mode
the copy is obtained, it is the use of it
for representation which operates to
deprive the author of his right"
Turning now to the decisions upon
the kindred composition-the lecture-the result will be found to have
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been worked out similar to that which them!' As to the other matter, the
in the case of the play was soon case was allowed to stand over to
arrived at-viz.: that the delivery of permit the plaintiff to produce his
a lecture is not such a publication as manuscript. Dr. Abernethy made
will authorize its printing by one of affidavit that he did not strictly read
the audience to whom it has been his lecture, but delivered orally from
delivered. An injunction seems to written notes carefully prepared from
have been issued in 1771 in Cullen v. time to time, containing the results
Lowndes, restraining the publication
of his study and experience. Lord
of Prof. Cullen's lectures without the ELD0x the next year (1825) granted
an injunction, but it would seem from
assent of the author, but the first
fully reported case we have upon the a reading of the case to have gone
subject is Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 rather on the ground that the notes
from which the publication was made
L. J. Ch. 209, begun in 1824. In
that case Dr. Abernethy had delivered having been taken by a student, it
lectures in a professional capacity, was a breach of an implied condition
and Tke Lancet began the publication
upon which the note taker was perthereof. The doctor applied to Lord mitted to hear the lecture, than on
ELDON for an injunction. It was the ground of literary property. The
agreed before him inter alia that the question then seemed to rest in Englectures were delivered in a public land until .licolsv. Pitman, L. R. 26,
capacity and hence were public prop- Ch. D. 374 (1884). In that case the
erty. The Chancellor, though with plaintiff had delivered the discourse
characteristic caution he doubted as before a workingman's college. Itwas
to whether the lecture fell within the delivered orally, but had been predefinition of literaryproperty, had no viously written; the audience was addoubt as to the position above men- mitted byticket. The defendant took
tioned and said: "Now, if a professor the lecture in short-hand and printed
be appointed, he is appointed for the it. An injunction was issued. KAY, J.,
purpose of giving information to all referring to the opinion of Lord
the students who attend him and it ELDOx in the Abernethy case, said:
is his duty to do that, but I have "I take his meaning to be this, that
never yet heard that anybody could where a lecture of this kind is depublish his lectures nor can I con- livered to an audience, especially
ceive on what ground Sir William where the audience is a limited one
Blackstone had the copyright in his admitted by ticket, the understanding
lectures for twenty years if there had between the lecturer and the audience
been such a right as that: we used to is, that whether the lecture has been
take notes at his lectures; and at Sir committed to writing beforehand or
Robert Chambers' lectures, also, the not, the audience are quite at liberty
students used to take notes, but it to take the fullest notes they like for
never was understood that those lec- their own personal purposes but they
tures could be published; and with are not at liberty having taken those
respect to any other lectures in the notes, to use them afterwards for the
University it was the duty of certain purpose of publishing the lecture for
persons to give those lectures, but it profit.'
never was understood that the lecThe same question, slightly moditures were capable of being published fied, arose in the Ufnited States in
by any of the persons who heard .Miller'sAppea, 15 W. N. C. 27 (1884).

